II. Final Status Issues

i. Self-Determination

The Right to Self-Determination for the Palestinians

The right to self-determination for the Palestinian people has a minimum territorial basis of the OT, those territories of the former British mandate that were occupied by Israel in 1967. Such a right has been endorsed by United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions 1514 (XV), 2672 (XXV-1970), and 3236 (XXIV-1974).

However, it remains a fact that the international norm of self-determination remains elusive due to a lack of clarity of the legal scope of self-determination, which undermines its application in practice. Furthermore, the right to self-determination can result in the emergence of a sovereign state, free association with an independent state, and integration with an independent state, or “any other political status freely determined”. Therefore, the exact outcome of a claim to self-determination must be determined by the wishes of the citizens of the OT.

The agreements of the peace process have avoided explicit references to self-determination, although there is general reference to the fact that the process is bound by international standards of human rights, which of course include self-determination. The ambiguity of the agreements demonstrates the conflicting goals of negotiated settlement, the goal of Palestinian Statehood on the one hand and the much-reduced concept of Palestinian Authority (PA) on the other.

The demand for national self-determination to end the oppression, discrimination, and occupation of any given group, national or otherwise, represents a claim that is self-evident and universally valid. Thus, any political system which violates this right by means of occupation, censorship, or police repression must be resisted (resistance, including armed resistance, ought to be properly defined as self-defense, not “violence”). The basis of self-determination is, therefore, inextricably linked to the process of decolonization.

The concept of autonomy is hostile to the idea of self-determination, for history has shown that the more a people is given “internal self-determination”, the weaker the claim for “external self-determination.” That is, autonomy weakens the Palestinian people’s claim to self-determination. Consequently, self-determination depends on decolonization, and autonomy will never be sufficient.

This statement needs to be examined in light of the fact that sovereignty and the ability to control resources are and will be a fundamental issue. The focus on Palestinian statehood as the crucial issue is misplaced, and instead the issue of equity should receive emphasis. The illusion of a “state” (especially in the new international context of globalization, in which even the word “state” has bizarre connotations) leads to the marginalization of the fundamental issues – such as equity and justice - which lie behind the struggle for a Palestinian state. Without addressing these issues, there is unlikely to be a workable peace settlement.

Self-determination as an on-going process

The right to self-determination is “a right to democracy and respect for human rights.” The concept places an emphasis on representative government and freedom from abuse of human rights. One election does not make a democracy. Democratization and state formation are progressive and successful to the extent that the government is responsive and accountable to the citizens and the international community.

At this critical stage of Palestinian self-determination, the undertaking of interim legislation and the training of officials based on international standards will confirm the commitment to human rights that Palestinians have long expressed in exile and under occupation.

Self-determination should be used to argue for a particular outcome and should be seen as an on-going process rather than an end in itself. Therefore, deficiencies in representation, deficiencies in accountability, and human rights abuses by Palestinian authorities are not only wrong in themselves, but can actually weaken the claim to self-determination and play into the hands of the occupying forces.

Citizenship and the Right to Self-Determination

The right to self-determination has two components: individual and collective. “Individuals” have the right to decide independently their lifestyle and civility/citizenship. The “group/population” has the right to determine its political, economic and social systems.

In the absence of a state, citizenship in Palestine, which is connected with the right to self-determination, developed into a relationship between the citizen and his homeland, not between the citizen and his government.

Since the occupation in 1967, along with the social aspects of citizenship and the right to self-determination, the tribal, family, and organic differences of the Palestinian people began to dissolve as their internal ties grew stronger. The Intifada represented the climax of this integration process inside the OT.

Current Status of Palestinian identity

Today, some 7 million persons in the world are “Palestinians”. But only 2.5 million normally reside in the OT, including East Jerusalem.

Inside the homeland: retention of Palestinian identity.

West Bank Palestinians: Jordanian

Gaza Palestinians: not identified

In the Diaspora: combination between the upgrading and loss of their identity.

The denial of Palestinian identity and the imposition of alternative “identities” on the Palestinian people in Israel, Jordan and other countries contradicts with the right to self-determination, which identifies the right of people to choose their identity.

The best criteria on which to base Palestinian citizenship in a future independent state would be that of territorial origin in combination, on a subsidiary level, with the criteria of residence.

 

ii. Refugees

The Palestinian refugee problem began in 1948 when nearly 750,000 Palestinians were expelled and/or fled from their country as a result of the establishment of the Israeli state on nearly 70% of historic Palestine. The number of registered refugees

and their dependants today is roughly 3 million, out of which 1 million still live in the harsh physical condition of semi-permanent refugee camps.

International Approaches to the Palestinian Refugee Problem

The UN has dealt extensively with the issue of the Palestinian refugees, not only through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), but also through political action aimed at securing their repatriation.

The primary statement of the UN on this issue was UNGA Resolution 194 (3) of 1948, in which the Assembly called on Israel to repatriate Palestinian refugees. That resolution has never been enacted due to the Israeli government’s refused to accept it.

As it became clear that the Palestinian refugees would likely remain for some time in the states in which they had taken refuge, the UNGA suggested to Arab states that they resettle displaced Palestinians in their territory. It did so first in Resolution 153 of 1951, reaffirming it in later resolutions. Once again, the UNGA viewed resettlement in Arab states as a complement, not an alternative, to repatriation.

In 1959, the UN recommended that UNRWA concentrate on rehabilitating the refugees in order to assist in their integration and resettlement wherever they sought refuge. This proposal also failed, as UNRWA has failed, due to neglect of the political dimension to the refugee problem according to Resolution 302 of 1949.

The UN reaffirmed its position on the right of return after more Palestinians were displaced in 1967. The UNSC, in its Resolution 237 of that year, called on Israel to “facilitate the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since

the (1967) outbreak of hostilities”. Also in 1967, the UNSC adopted Resolution 242 regarding an overall settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict with respect to the displaced Palestinians. The SC called for “a just settlement of the refugee problem”. It should be pointed out that “just settlement” must be read in light of prior UN

positions; thus, it must mean repatriation. This resolution became the cornerstone of almost every subsequent peace initiative in the Middle East.

After the 1973 War, UNSC Resolution 338 called for the immediate implementation of the requirements of Resolution 242 as the basis for settlement. In dealing with the Palestinian refugee problem, Resolutions 242 and 338 retreated considerably from the positions in Resolution 194(3) and 302 of 1949. The resolutions of 1967 and 1973 affirmed the need to achieve a just solution to the refugee problem without specifying the kind of solution or who constituted refugees.

The next two international attempts also regarded Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for settlement: the Camp David Summit in 1978 and the Madrid peace conference in 1991. Neither of them mentioned the Refugee Problem.

Finally, the DOP in 1993 mentioned the refugee issue in Article V (3), which illustrated that the refugee issue would be discussed in the FSN, and Article 12, which stipulated that a committee should be formed to discuss the methods and ways of allowing those who fled during the 1967 war to return.

Individual vs. Collective Right.

The treatment of the conflict in Palestine-Israel by the UN in the 1950s and 1960s focused on the Palestinians as individuals, while from the 1970s the UN focused on the Palestinians as an entity.

This shift raises the question of the current character of the right of return for Palestinian refugees- is return an individual or a collective matter? It can be said that at the UN, even after the Palestinian issue came to be seen as a collective one in the 1970s, the question of repatriation continued to be viewed as an individual right. Therefore, displaced Palestinians who may not be provided for in the Oslo Agreements can be expected to claim return on an individual basis.

Attitudes of the refugees towards the peace process

There are similar views about the peace process in the sense that it aims to create stability in the region for US interests. Regarding the question of return, refugees divide the solution into two stages: compensation to improve living conditions, then the return to their places of origin. Considering that, the peace process has not yet achieved any benefits for the refugees as a whole.

Although the refugees have a lack of confidence in the peace process, at the same time their attitude reveals a significant trend of readiness to find a realistic solution: accepting compensation and returning home under Israeli rule.

To conclude, there is a division between the international attempts at reaching a solution and the Palestinian refugees’ attitudes toward finding a solution to the refugee problem:

- Refugees’ mistrust and suspicion toward the peacemakers.

As a result, the realistic solution should consider all of the issues in the phenomenon of refugees: security, economy, mistrust of the peacemakers/Arab leaders, and land. To do this, participation at the grassroots level is quite important. This could demonstrate the segregation of the refugee problem, which could facilitate finding a solution to the demands of significant numbers for repatriation and of others for compensation. However, Palestinian demand for the application of UNGA 194 Resolution should be on the basis of any agreement.

The nationality of the Palestinian refugees

Palestinian refugees and Israel

Under general international law, not everyone has a right to enter the territory of a state. That right is enjoyed only by nationals, and perhaps by permanent residents. On the basis of this principle, Israel took the position that Palestinian refugees, not being nationals of Israel, and not (at least currently) residing there, had no right to return.

UNGA Resolution 194 implicitly rejects any arguments about the nationality of the Palestinian refugees. It calls simply for the repatriation of the displaced Palestinians, without referring to their nationality. This approach is consistent with international practice, which states that an inhabitant of territory coming under new sovereignty acquires the nationality of the new sovereign. The inference of nationality applies to all who carry the nationality of the prior state, regardless of whether they were currently resident in that state. Human rights law, moreover, requires a new sovereign to extend its nationality to inhabitants that do not reject it.

Palestinian Refugees and the PNA

The Israeli launching point to dissolve the Palestinian position towards the refugee issue will be the Palestinian refugees residing in lands under the jurisdiction of the PNA or in lands to become part of its control.

The nature of the relationship between any refugees and the host state differs from the relationship between the state and its citizens, who are connected with the country through the legal-political bond known as citizenship. Refugees on the contrary, have no legal or political bonds with the host country, which usually provides them with shelter and grants some privileges, such as legal residence, education and work. It should be recalled that no country has the legal right to enforce citizenship on refugees residing in its territories.

Taking this into account, any Palestinian authority should be the authority that provides protection and shelter.

Limiting the representation of the PNA to Palestinian citizens from the West Bank before 1948 and those displaced in 1967 does not mean in any way the marginalization of the role of refugees or the disregard of their political weight. It is meant as a procedure to consolidate the Palestinian position in the negotiations concerning refugees to confront Israeli positions based on the principle of integrating refugees into their host countries. This should coincide with additional measures that ensure the rights of Palestinian refugees, whether they are in the Diaspora or residing in Palestinian land. The most comprehensive framework representing Palestinian refugees is the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Therefore, reconsidering the mechanisms for representing refugees in PLinstitutions and reinforcing the principle of popular participation are vital steps at this stage.

 

iii. Jerusalem

Determining the legal status of Jerusalem should be the responsibility and privilege of the inhabitants of the city, due to the fact that they must make Jerusalem a living

entity regardless the final status settlement. Regardless, this is not the concern of the three monotheistic religions and religious arguments must not determine territorial claims. The most appropriate framework for solving the conflict on Jerusalem is to be found in International Law.

Sovereignty is a stable legal concept belonging to the people. It is an absolute possession of the people. It may be suspended or stopped if the people are under occupation or mandate, yet the people do not lose it nor can they compromise it. Sovereignty is also not for God in terms of set law.

Status of Jerusalem in International Law

The beginning of the consideration of Jerusalem under international law goes back to 1922 when the League of Nations created a British Mandate over Palestine.

At that time only 10% of the Palestinian population was Jewish. During the Mandate period, which ended in 1948, the percentage of Jews residing in Palestine increased to 25%, but to 48% in Jerusalem.

The next discussion of Jerusalem in international law was the UN Partition Plan of 1947 that recognized the “international” character of Jerusalem and stated that it should be a “corpus separatum” with a special international regime administered by the United Nations (UNGA Resolution 181)

However, hostilities broke out and resulted in the creation of the State of Israel and the expulsion of thousands of Palestinians from their homes. The entire western half of Jerusalem was incorporated into the state of Israel, while the eastern sector, including the Old City, uniting with Jordan.

The Palestinians thus became “absentees” and are still absentees 50 years later.

Following the Six Day war in 1967, Israel forcefully occupied the entire West Bank and East Jerusalem, including the Old City. They declared the whole city as the “eternal undivided capital of Israel.”

Since then, Israel has pursued a policy of replacing the Arab Palestinians with Jewish settlers and settlements.

All Israeli measures in Jerusalem, whether the usurpation of Modern Jerusalem, the expulsion of its inhabitants, the confiscation of Arab property, or the transfer of Jews to the city, are illegal and null and void under international law.

The Way to a Solution

Many solutions to the question of Jerusalem have been suggested, and the common denominator for them seems to be that:

- Functional jurisdiction should be given to one overall Municipality

In addition to these common denominators, there should also be provision for an international UN presence.

 

iv. Settlements

Settlements vs. Right to Self-Determination

In the spirit of international law is the idea that occupation cannot claim any kind of sovereignty, which is reserved for the people.

The last paragraph of Article 49 of the IV Geneva Convention forbids the occupying power from transfering a part of its own population to the OT. There is, thus, a prohibition against colonizing the occupied territory, which is precisely the aim of the settlement policy undertaken by the Israeli Government.

Israeli settlement is a violation of human rights and self-determination, representing a struggle for property on the basis of racial discrimination. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that ”All persons are equal before the law and entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law”. Israeli civil law is selectively applied to the settlers, while military law is applied to the Palestinians.

The settlements are not military bases, which can be easily dismantled, but living entities. Each settler in the Territories represents Israeli sovereignty. They need an

army to protect them and bypass roads for their use; indeed, settlers are the rationale for the continued military occupation.

Settlements in the Context of the Oslo Agreements.

Status of the Occupied Territories

Settlements have affected the status of the OT, particularly in the post-Oslo era. The Oslo agreements establish Palestinian recognition of settlements as an integral element of Israeli policy in the OT. Settlements and settlers have been awarded a status separate and different from Palestinians and their communities, with rights and legitimacy that were absent until the advent of Oslo. This recognition was a tremendous achievement for Israel, one which it will not easily surrender as part of a final status agreement. Settlements have become the centerpiece of Israel’s claim to exercise permanent and strategic control of the entire area.

The Israeli settlement policy is changing the map of the West Bank and Gaza. The West Bank is now divided into two separate parts and the map for a future state is clearly being drawn, but from an Israeli point of view. Although settlement construction in Gaza has proceeded at a slower pace, settlements do occupy 42% of the land, much of which lies above Gaza’s fresh water supply. The aim is to guarantee the continuity of Israeli control in the Strip, to divide the North and the South, and to prevent any viable political integrity from developing.

Rights of the Previous Owners to Land Confiscated for Settlements.

There has been no legally recognized principle in Israeli jurisprudence established to protect the claims of the Palestinian owners of confiscated lands. Nor do the Oslo accords establish a mechanism for acknowledging their rights, although the rights of settlers/settlements are meticulously addressed.

Ironically, once a specific settlement is recognized (in a final status agreement for example) as permanent, then the Israeli courts can be expected to revisit the rights of Palestinian landowners, that is, unless these rights are surrendered as part of a final status agreement.

Settlers generally hold title to their houses, but they lease the land on which their homes are built. The state or its institutions are the owner of record for most confiscated land in the OT, as well as for over 90% of the land in Israel. Israel might, as part of the final status agreement, cede title to some or all of these OT lands, leaving it to the PNA to sort out ownership claims.

The precedent of the Israeli government’s compensation of individual homeowners as part of the evacuation of Sinai settlements is as good a guide as any to what will happen in the event that any settlements in the OT are evacuated.

Settlement Policy of the Netanyahu Government

One of the basic requirements for the continuation of the peace process was the freezing of settlement expansion. The former Labor administration’s decision to follow such a policy has been sadly reversed by the Likud-led coalition of Netanyahu, under which settlement expansion has escalated at an unprecedented rate.

Israeli investment in settlements will increase 20% from 1997 to 1998. The government of Israel’s 1998 budget includes the allocation of US$285 million to settlements to be used for bypass roads, promotion of Israeli agricultural development, subsidies and tax breaks to encourage would-be settlers to move to the settlements, and security for Israeli settlers in East Jerusalem.

Settlements are an issue that cannot be postponed because their daily expansion changes the reality about which the parties will have to negotiate.

 

v. Security

Nexus between Security and Statehood

The essential stakes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the systems by which nation-states and people define their existence, sovereignty, territory, and above all, their security.

Sis a supreme goal for any country in the area, and complete security for anyone may contradict the integrity of mutual security for all.

    1. For Israel, two basic dilemmas are the relationship of territory to security and survival and the question of secure boundaries. From the Israeli perspective, the main threats to security are terrorist activities, which must be stamped out by whatever means necessary.

    2. From a Palestinian point of view, the notion of security is inextricably bound with the end of occupation, freedom of movement, expression, the right to safe enjoyment of property and employment, and not least, personal safety both internally and externally.

      3. Military Sanctions for Security Reasons

      Drastic measures employed by Israel against Palestinians include:

      Closures

      The expropriation of land and water resources, the repression and denial of basic freedoms and human rights, and the Military Closure have been Israeli measures implemented inside the OT for dubious “security reasons”.

      If we examine the “security” of the Israelis prior and after the imposition of the military closure, we find that their “security” was much better before its imposition.

      The military closure has not brought any security to Israel, but has produced unemployment, pauperization, and shortages of food inside the OT. This fact, together with the fact that closures were not used extensively during the Intifada when the level of Palestinian violence was at its height, forces us to conclusion that the imposition of strict military closures is more closely related to politico-economic interests than security oriented ones.

      Use of excessive force

      Palestinian detainees are subjected to torture during interrogation in contravention of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ratified by Israel in 1991)

      The 1987 Landau Report allowed the use of “moderate physical pressure” and, since October 1994, a special ministerial committee has allowed “increased physical pressure, “ which amounts to torture according to UN Committee Against Torture(CAT).

      Procedure of Administrative Detention

      Administrative detention allows the holding of a detainee without charge or trial in violation of fundamental human rights. Article 9 of the ICCPR states that no one should be subjected to arbitrary detention

      House Demolition

      Since the occupation, Israel has destroyed or sealed more than 2,000 homes in the OT. Israeli policy allows such action if one member or a tenant is awaiting trial, under interrogation or “wanted” for a broad range of security offences. This violates a range

      of international standards/rights including the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (Art. 14 ICCPR), and the right not to be subjected to unlawful interference with one’s privacy, family and home (Art. 17 ICCPR). International humanitarian law (Arts. 33 and 53 IV Geneva Convention) also prohibits these measures.

      Issues to be debated in FSN in order to achieve an Agreed Upon Security Structure:

    3. The party that will be in charge of the agreed upon security procedure: whether Palestinian, Israeli or joint

    4. The type of the agreed upon security procedure: collecting information, complaints, arrest and detention, use of force, investigation

    5. The party that may threaten or provoke: civil or non-civil Palestinians, ordinary Israelis, settlers, army or Israeli security forces

    6. Type of threat or provocation: armed assaults for political purposes, provocation, armed or unarmed assaults for criminal intentions

    7. The place where the security threat or provocation took place

      8. Security under PNA’s Self-Rule Territories

      As regards policing, the interim arrangements stated that there should be “a strong police force.” In 1994, the Cairo Agreement came into force and gave Palestinians responsibility for their own internal security arrangements in those areas under the jurisdiction of the PNA (Art. 11.6). Israel continues to carry responsibility for external security as well as the overall security of Israelis.

      Initially, the Palestinian police were warmly welcomed. However, over time, a number of factors led to brutal and repressive policing. Security has been characterized by lack of procedures and accountability.

      The definition and application of law relating to the administration of justice and public security are essential elements of self-government. There are clear signs that Palestinian people want self-government to be based upon the rule of law and a regime protective of human rights. The Palestinian Council could fill the existing gap by adopting interim provisions as a precursor to a democratic constitution to be elaborated following the FSN.

      A widely acceptable police force is an essential ingredient/prerequisite of any lasting peace settlement. To achieve this aim there must be put in place a democratic structure.

      Key principles:

    8. Narrow political and group interests should have no part to play in the setting up of a police security force: policing/security needs to be impartial/fair

    9. Respect for human rights should lie at the heart of the process. Therefore, training human rights and cultural awareness should be enforced

    10. Good police/community relations are vital

      11.  

       

       

       

    11. There must be a recognition that militaristic behavior must be unlearned

    12. Systems of accountability must be a priority

    13. Any different forces created must co-operate effectively

    14. A legal system framed according to international human rights standards must be implemented

 

vi. Economic relations

Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations (prior to and after the Oslo Accords)

Relationship imposed through 2 mechanisms:

- Status quo emerging from Israeli military occupation.

Since the occupation, specific politico-economic relations, have developed between the occupying power and the OT that closely resemble classical colonialism. The Oslo Accords have not produced a process of decolonisation of the OT. These colonial policies aim basically at the perpetuation of Israeli dominance over the Palestinian market.

Major focal points:

Total Israeli control and continued policy of depletion.

Performance of both economies after the Oslo Accords

The Palestinian economy has been unable to benefit from the peace process, except for assistance from the donor countries, which was depleted in compensating for the losses. The Israeli economy, on the other hand, has exploited the peace process in achieving significant gains, especially in the field of export and attracting foreign investment.

If aspirations are diretowards achieving permanent peace, Palestine should obtain full control over trade (external and internal), land and water resources, and administration of public revenues and spending.

A Political-Economic Analysis of economic relations and development

Current situation

As a result of the Israeli policy of closure, the living conditions in Palestine have deteriorated as never before.

Statistics indicate that currently 10.5% of the West Bank and 36.3% of the Gaza population live in absolute poverty, a condition that has worsened for the poor since mid-1994.

And parallel to this increase in the poverty level, there is a stark deterioration in standards of living. During the period 1993-95, for example, the West Bank witnessed a 19.7% loss of per capita GDP and Gaza a fall of 8.4%.

International context

Political and economic pressures are increasingly limiting the ability of Palestinians and the PNA to take any meaningful decisions.

Internal pressure and context

As part of the Oslo process, changes and shifts in sociopolitical groups in Palestinian Society have occurred.

Palestinian patronage, arising precisely from the interaction of processes of social change, attempts to manage social fragmentation and immediate organizational and political imperatives.

“Neopatrimonial” economic management practices:

Prospects for industry

Although industry only currently accounts for 7% of GDP (with services and commerce accounting for 58%, construction for 21%, and agriculture for 14%), it is expected and anticipated that industry will be a major focus of growth in the medium to long terms and will provide significant employment. There is currently important support being given to assist local industries.

The dual problems of internal and external factors facing Palestinians industries are prolonged closure and corruption vs. regional competition as a result of peace agreements (between Israel and Arab countries like Jordan and Egypt) and the global economic and production system.

Conclusion

There will be no lasting peace without an increase in the standards of living. With living standards falling to such levels, the preoccupation of most Gazans has become less the national struggle against Israel and more the basic struggle for social and economic survival. Increasingly their anger is being directed as much against their own regime as against the occupation.

Recommendations

vii. Natural Resources

The right of peoples to self-determination is not limited to political and cultural aspects. It also includes economic aspects, such as the right of people to control their natural riches and national resources, something which the UN reaffirmed in 1962 when it issued “The Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources”.

Environment and Water are indispensable sectors to safeguard adequate social and economic development, and to ensure the acceptable promotion of health.

Israel and Israeli occupation practices (restrictions, military orders, laws) on water and environment have openly contradicted all international norms, conventions and agreements and violated the IV Geneva Convention of 1949 and The Hague Convention of 1907.

Environment Impact of Israeli Occupation

Since the settlements themselves are illegal, environmental problems caused by the presence of settlers in the OT, such as sewage disposal (that destroys crops and contaminates water), pesticide attacks, tree uprooting, and exploitation of water resources, are also violations of international law

Water Resources

After its occupation of the Golan Heights, by which it obtained control of two of the three sources (the Banias and Dan rivers) of the Jordan River, Israel is the de facto uppermost riparian of the five parties sharing the water resources of the Jordan Valley.

Prior to 1993, Israel made a claim to absolute territorial sovereignty. This claim has now been affected by the DOP, in which the Israelis and Palestinians committed themselves to the principle of equitable use of resources.

However, no attempt has been made to define what “equitable utilization” means. The Israeli-Palestinian agreements refer only to customary international law as providing the basis of their rights to their shared water resources. Therefore, they leave it open for argument as to the agreed upon standards and the application thereof.

In the absence of guidance, the model suggested is the one partially reflected in the Taba Agreement. By establishing the Joint Water Committee (JWC), that agreement recognizes the importance of coordinating the management of water. An integrated transnational institution approach (ultimately involving the other parties: Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) would have the added advantage of making the issue of water a source of unity, not division.

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