"Israel's Closure Policy: An Ineffective Strategy = of Containment and Repression" (Spring 2002)

From: Subject: "Israel's Closure Policy: An Ineffective Strategy of Containment and Repression" (Spring 2002) Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2002 13:23:30 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0000_01C22039.53BFD220"; type="text/html" X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0000_01C22039.53BFD220 Content-Type: text/html; charset="windows-1256" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: file://E:\Mette\Web%20site\articles\Israel's%20Closure%20Policy_Hass_Journal_PS.htm "Israel's Closure Policy: An Ineffective Strategy = of Containment and Repression" (Spring 2002)

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Vol XXXI, No. = 3, Spring=20 2002, Issue 123

ISRAEL'S CLOSURE = POLICY: AN=20 INEFFECTIVE STRATEGY OF CONTAINMENT AND REPRESSION=20

AMIRA = HASS

This = article examines=20 the Israeli policy of closure from its introduction in 1991 = through its=20 consolidation under Oslo, when its devastating potential was = heightened=20 by an intermeshing with Oslo II's division of the occupied = territories=20 into zones of Israeli and Palestinian control. The author argues = that=20 closure, first applied as a military-bureaucratic preemptive = security=20 measure, crystallized with Oslo into a conscious political goal: = demographic separation without meaningful political separation. = Despite=20 the absence of an organized Palestinian resistance to closure, = the=20 reasons for which are explored here, a spirit of resilience and = defiance=20 has enabled the population to bear up under closure's = intensification=20 during the present uprising, when virtually all movement is = banned and=20 the territories are under siege.

AMIRA = HASS, the Ha'aretz = correspondent=20 in the occupied territories, is the author of Drinking the Sea at = Gaza:=20 Days and Nights in a Land under Siege (Metropolitan Books, 1999). = This=20 article is based on a talk the author gave before the Middle East = Studies=20 Association in November 2001.=20

IT WAS LATE = OCTOBER 2000. A=20 military checkpoint and a couple of edgy soldiers at the exit of = Beitunia,=20 southwest of Ramallah, made for a long queue of Palestinian cars = that one=20 by one turned on their lights as the dusk thickened. Those drivers = whose=20 nerves were not too frayed by the long wait might have noticed a = bizarre=20 new feature to the east of the road: in the vast military area = adjacent to=20 the Israeli army camp Ofer, massive though innocuous-looking = concrete=20 slabs were stacked and in rows. Beyond the military area and camp, = a wide=20 new highway was in the last stages of construction. Its purpose = was to=20 connect Israel to its distant outcroppings in the West Bank, such = as=20 Ma'ale Adumim settlement and the Jordan Valley outposts. Further = on, less=20 than a kilometer south of the military camp and the crawling line = of cars,=20 one could see thousands of merrily twinkling lights proclaiming = the=20 expansive settlement of Givat Ze'ev.

Within a week, = Palestinian=20 cars were no longer allowed through the Beitunia checkpoint, the = main=20 access to Ramallah for about a dozen villages in the region. Some = laid=20 back soldiers, a moveable barrier, and a row of spikes made sure = that only=20 foreign diplomatic cars could get through. A few weeks later, the = road was=20 blocked altogether, the makeshift barricade having been replaced = by a more=20 permanent artificial sand bank and some of those innocuous-looking = concrete slabs. Now, well over a year later, a new exit on the = completed=20 super highway allows Israeli access to Ofer camp. But the = Palestinian=20 western road to Ramallah has been permanently closed, as have the = feeder=20 roads that used to connect the villages to Ramallah.

Since the = eruption of the=20 second Palestinian intifada in the last days of September 2000, = towns and=20 villages all over the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been gradually = and=20 systematically sealed off in similar fashion. In some areas, deep = trenches=20 or barricades of sand and rock prevent any traffic in or out of a = given=20 village or region; in many others, simple concrete barriers do the = job.=20 The closer the village or town to an Israeli settlement, the more = isolated=20 and hermetically sealed it is.

Throughout the = variegated=20 landscapes of the West Bank, hundreds of such blockades close off=20 Palestinian communities large and small, sometimes reinforced by = huge=20 tanks and other armored vehicles as well as fixed positions from = which=20 unseen soldiers keep machine guns and cannons trained on = pedestrians. With=20 Palestinian traffic banned from all the main and secondary roads, = clusters=20 of yellow group taxis gather at each such barrier, and groups of = people=20 trying to get to work, school, clinics, universities, relatives' = houses,=20 or markets clamber up and down sand embankments or across ditches = to=20 circumvent concrete slabs and soldiers, who sometimes shoot at = them. At=20 each cluster, simultaneously the terminal and starting point of = yet=20 another segment on the improvised network of dirt and track = "roads,"=20 people have to change transport, walking several hundred meters in = scorching heat or pouring rain, through dust or mud, to get to the = cluster=20 of waiting cars at the other side. A journey that would normally = take=20 twenty-five minutes has turned into an ordeal of two to three = hours or=20 more.

This process has = been=20 spreading and intensifying throughout the territories since = September=20 2000, but it is not new: the 1.1 million inhabitants of Gaza have = been=20 penned up in the narrow, 360 km2 Strip since 1991, unable to leave = freely.=20 What is now happening all over the West Bank replicates and = multiplies=20 what Gazans have experienced for a decade. In terms of the Israeli = policy=20 of "closure," it is a quantitative, not a qualitative, = change.

EVOLUTION OF = A=20 POLICY

In its simplest = definition,=20 "closure" (seger in Hebrew, ighlaq in Arabic) as it = has=20 evolved over the last decade in the Occupied Palestinian = Territories (OPT)=20 means to deprive the Palestinian inhabitants of their right to = free=20 movement. It involves a pass system first introduced in early 1991 = and=20 which has been refined and perfected ever since. Needless to say, = in the=20 same Palestinian territories where Palestinians need special = permits to=20 move around, Israeli citizens circulate freely.

On the eve of = the Gulf War=20 in 1991, an Israeli military order canceled an earlier order that = granted=20 all Palestinian inhabitants a "general exit permit" to Israel. = Issued in=20 the West Bank in the early 1970s, the general exit permit, which = in effect=20 assured Palestinians free movement in Israel, was extended to Gaza = only in=20 the mid-1980s, but in practice Gazans had enjoyed a similar = freedom of=20 movement almost since the West Bank order. This free movement was = not=20 "conferred" in the interests of equality-Jews were allowed and, = indeed,=20 encouraged to settle in the 1967 occupied territories, but = Palestinians=20 had no reciprocal right in Israel-but was one of Moshe Dayan's = measures=20 for economically integrating the OPT into Israel with the aim of = toning=20 down Palestinian national aspirations and undermining the = feasibility of=20 an independent Palestinian state. But whatever the motives, = freedom of=20 movement meant a great deal for the individual Palestinian, both=20 economically and socially. It also proved extremely valuable to = the three=20 hitherto separated Palestinian communities of the West Bank, Gaza = Strip,=20 and Israel proper, allowing them to reestablish direct contacts = and=20 reconsolidate the national and cultural common ground that endured = despite=20 the differences that had developed or been accentuated during the = years of=20 separation.

It is true that = even at the=20 outset there were exceptions to the blanket rule of general exit = permit:=20 "security" suspects were prevented from free movement at various = times, as=20 were criminals, unless they joined Israel's army of collaborators. = But=20 these were exceptions, and in general the Palestinian right to = freedom of=20 movement was respected by the Israeli authorities. Even when there = were=20 fierce Palestinian attacks against Israeli civilians in Israel, no = one=20 demanded that entrances to Israel be sealed off.

Some broader = exceptions to=20 the rule were introduced with the first intifada as of 1988. In = Gaza, a=20 magnetic card was imposed on anyone wishing to travel to Israel. = This=20 second identity card, renewable yearly for a fee to Palestinians = presumed=20 not to represent a security threat, tightened control over the = Gazan=20 population. Meanwhile, at about the same time in the West Bank, = the "green=20 identity card" (as opposed to the ordinary orange one) was = introduced for=20 "security cases"--former prisoners and activists--preventing them = from=20 crossing the Green Line. But the majority of the population = continued to=20 be able to exercise their right to free movement throughout the = entire=20 territory, just as Israelis did.

It was the Gulf = War that=20 provided the occasion to reverse this situation of free movement = for the=20 many and prohibition for the few. From then on, there was a = blanket denial=20 of the right for all Palestinians, with exceptions being made for = certain=20 explicit categories--including workers, merchants, people in need = of=20 medical treatment, collaborators, and important Palestinian=20 personalities--which were granted passes. In principle, this has = been the=20 rule since then, though its practice has been modified and = tightened with=20 time.

Between the = revocation of=20 the general exit permit in 1991 and March 1993, when Israeli = police began=20 launching relentless pursuits to capture and arrest "infiltrators" = and=20 military courts started imposing heavy fines on those caught = without the=20 proper pass, the regulations were still vague. Checkpoints were = not=20 systematic and there were no "borders" per se; it was still fairly = easy to=20 sneak out, even from the Strip. Moreover, the new rules seemed to = be=20 enforced mainly concerning entry into Israel, with travel between = the West=20 Bank and Gaza being more tolerated. Still, during those first two = years of=20 closure, the number of Palestinian workers in Israel was slashed, = setting=20 off a chain of economic blows to individual Palestinian families = and the=20 community. Trips to Israel for shopping or other normal activities = were=20 already becoming a thing of the past. Gradually, travel between = the West=20 Bank and Gaza also became increasingly difficult and, finally, = almost=20 impossible.

A second = "novelty" was=20 introduced in March 1993: the entire municipality of East = Jerusalem, which=20 Israel greatly expanded and annexed in 1967, was incorporated de = facto=20 into the no-entry Israeli territory. Ever since that time, the = Palestinian=20 cultural, religious, institutional, economic, and commercial = capital has=20 been encircled, with ever-expanding bureaucratic measures and = regulations=20 forbidding or "thinning" Palestinian entry into the city. At = first, only=20 men under forty needed permits, then women as well, and finally = everybody=20 of all ages required them.

The Israeli pass = system,=20 introduced not long before the Madrid peace conference and at a = time when=20 the Palestinian-Israeli negotiating process was already in the = planning=20 stages, was consolidated during the Oslo years. Indeed, it was = with the=20 establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994 that the = special=20 bureaucratic-military machinery of the pass system was developed, = with=20 heavy input from Shin Bet. Palestinian officials became the = middlemen who=20 either transferred the Israeli-approved permits to their fellow=20 Palestinians or transmitted the rejection.

The pass system = turned a=20 universal basic right into a coveted privilege--or portion of a=20 privilege--allotted to a minority on a case-by-case basis. For the = privilege was not whole: it had gradations. Some passes permitted = an=20 overnight stay in Israel, others required return by dusk, a few = were for=20 an entire month. Some restricted means of transport to the special = group=20 taxis parked outside the Erez checkpoint in the Gaza Strip; a = handful=20 allowed the use of private cars from door to door. The hand that = giveth=20 also taketh away: some months as many as 1,000 businessmen might = be=20 granted passes, other months only 300; sometimes the passes for = Gazans=20 would be for Israel and the West Bank, sometimes only for the West = Bank.=20 It was thus that an entire society was stratified and segmented on = the=20 basis of whether one had access, and in what portion, to the = "privilege"=20 of freedom of movement.

The societal = segmentation=20 resulting from the pass system accompanied the territorial = segmentation=20 Israel initiated immediately after the 1967 war when it began = colonizing=20 the occupied territories. And like the curtailment of Palestinian=20 movement, the process of territorial fragmentation intensified = during the=20 "decade of peace." Not only did the settlements continue to grow, = but a=20 huge and ever-expanding network of high-quality bypass roads was = built in=20 the OPT linking Israeli settlements to each other and to Israel = proper,=20 while circumventing Palestinian communities and cutting = Palestinian=20 villages off from each other, from the larger towns, and even from = their=20 own fields and orchards.

With the Oslo II = (Taba)=20 agreement of September 1995, the final stage of the segmentation = was=20 achieved with the division of the West Bank, like the Gaza Strip = before=20 it, into a confusing mosaic of pieces of territory with differing = status=20 depending on the nature of the security control over them. Area A = enclaves=20 were to have "full" (in fact, limited) Palestinian security and = civil=20 control, area B had Israeli security and Palestinian civil = control, and=20 area C, the great mass of the land, was under full Israeli = control. As the=20 Palestinians understood it, the area under "full" Palestinian = control,=20 initially limited to the main towns, was gradually to be increased = so that=20 by the end of the interim period (originally set for May 1999) it = would=20 cover "most" of the West Bank apart from the built-up areas of the = settlements and the military installations (as stipulated vaguely = in the=20 accords). But as the transfer of territory was contingent upon the = PA's=20 good behavior and delivery of security goods (fighting terror and=20 preventing anti-Israeli violence), Israel alone could decide the = land=20 transfers. By September 2000, then, the area A enclaves totaled 18 = percent, whereas area C--the agricultural and development land=20 reservoir--covered a full 60 percent. In Gaza, meanwhile, 20 = percent of=20 the narrow Strip was set aside for the Israeli army and the = settlers,=20 representing 0.5 percent of the population.

In retrospect, = the most=20 significant feature of the zoning was not its delineation = according to=20 security control, which the PA had seen as the primary = achievement. The=20 second intifada demonstrates daily how the A zoning is no buffer = against=20 Israeli attacks and incursions. Indeed, it was only with the = outbreak of=20 the current uprising that the extraordinary ingenuity of the = "zoning"=20 system, backed by the network of bypass roads, could be fully = appreciated:=20 with most of the population living in the scattered islands of A = and B,=20 separated from each other by the vast ocean of C lands, hundreds = of=20 villages and half a dozen towns could be totally paralyzed by=20 strategically placed barricades and ditches, tanks, and IDF = sharpshooters,=20 thereby devastating an entire economy and disrupting all social = life. At=20 the same time, the fact that the great majority of the = Palestinians live=20 under ostensible PA civil responsibility enables Israel to = disclaim its=20 obligations toward the civilian population (even though legally it = remains=20 the occupier). With astonishing success, Israel, both before and = during=20 the current uprising, has managed to portray the dire economic and = other=20 civil repercussions of the closure-induced fragmentation, its own=20 invention as the occupying power, as none of its = concern.

SPACE AND = TIME: CLOSURE=20 AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Space and time = together make=20 "room" in one's world--not only materially to accomplish one's = tasks and=20 activities, but at the level of the spirit, enabling both the = individual=20 and the community to breathe, to develop, to prosper, to create. = Space in=20 the occupied territories has been gradually but relentlessly = encroached=20 upon for more than thirty years, as more and more land has been=20 expropriated. Palestinian groups have doggedly tracked this theft. = Strangely, however, little or no attention has been paid to = another kind=20 of theft, which especially in the last decade has also reached = massive=20 proportions: the theft of time as a byproduct of = closure.

Already with the = "normal"=20 closure policy introduced in 1991, which affected mainly Gazans, = the theft=20 of time was significant. Leaving the Strip for whatever reason--to = pursue=20 studies in West Bank universities, visit a new grandchild, take = part in a=20 meeting, look for a job, attend a wedding, see a dermatologist or = medical=20 specialist--required getting a permit (never guaranteed). Time was = wasted=20 filling out forms and obtaining supporting documents, standing in = line in=20 PA offices that acted as conduits for the Israelis, making = desperate phone=20 calls ten times a day to check whether the permit had arrived, = casting=20 around for people who might know someone with some pull with the = Israelis,=20 and so on.

There is another = consequence=20 of the closure policy. Beginning in 1991, and especially since the = Gaza-Jericho agreement of 1994, almost all Gazans--and later on = most West=20 Bankers--found that they could no longer make any plans: it was = impossible=20 to know until the very last minute whether one would get the = necessary=20 permit. While not being able to plan ahead, they also lost the = ability to=20 act spontaneously--and spontaneity is no less a human right than = travel=20 and food. For ten years people have not been able to decide on the = spur of=20 the moment to go, say, to see a sunrise in the desert, or visit a = new=20 bookstore in Ramallah or spend an evening with old friends. With = the=20 ability to plan or be spontaneous lost, many have lost the energy = and=20 determination required even to try to exercise their right to free = movement and escape from the cage. The temptation is great to let = the=20 externally imposed shrinking horizons dictate one's social, = spiritual, and=20 cultural life.

Since the = outbreak of the=20 al-Aqsa intifada in October 2000, the theft of time and of any = semblance=20 of normal activity has reached undreamed of proportions: students = do not=20 reach universities, ailing people and pregnant women are held at=20 checkpoints, and some even die or deliver on the road; = municipality=20 technicians cannot get an Israeli permit to repair a broken pipe = at the=20 outskirts of their own town; offices are half staffed; water tank = trucks=20 are not allowed into villages. Travel costs have tripled because = one must=20 change transport every 20 kilometers; people spend hours at a = stretch=20 waiting or detained at roadblocks. Raw materials travel faster = between=20 China and the Ashdod seaport than between Ashdod and Nablus. The = areas=20 most dramatically affected by this theft of space and time are the = villages and neighborhoods that happen to be near Jewish = settlements,=20 where even before the intifada people needed all kinds of permits = and=20 special arrangements to reach their own fields and orchards, with = added=20 inducements not to do so: a ferocious dog, a merciless security = officer=20 employed by the settlement, a blocked agricultural road, an olive = grove=20 put to fire. Today, such places are under months-long curfews, the = most=20 notorious example being Hebron, where 20,000 Palestinians have = been under=20 house arrest almost from the first day of the uprising for the = convenience=20 of 500 Jewish settlers.

For the last = seventeen=20 months, hundreds of thousands of people have been almost wholly = occupied=20 with the task of getting somewhere on time: through mud and rain = and under=20 the burning sun up and down the mountain, breathing hard, legs = aching.=20 Time is running, the tank's cannon is taking aim, an infant has = started=20 crying, an old lady needs assistance, the dust is blinding. = What is=20 that soldier saying in Hebrew, shouting, waving his hands? Is = someone=20 shooting? Yes! The soldier is shooting! Where can I hide? No place = to hide=20 . . . isn't it here that someone got killed just last = week?

What is now = given visual=20 form in the hundreds of roadblocks all over the West Bank was less = obvious=20 during the Oslo years, but it nevertheless existed: the need to = plead, to=20 beg, the prospect of being turned down, the anger, the repeated = trips to=20 the Palestinian liaison office, where one finds hundreds of people = with=20 incredible stories to which no one listens, the visit to an = Israeli=20 official who suggests, "If you help us, we'll help you"-meaning, = "Become a=20 collaborator, and you'll get your permit." The best minds in = Palestinian=20 offices, private and public, are taken up day and night with the = simple=20 task of retrieving a travel permit.

Unlike land, = which can be=20 restored and replaced and rehabilitated, time lost--through the = policy of=20 closure--is lost forever. The personal and collective benefits of = having=20 "space" are erased forever if not enjoyed and exercised in=20 "time."

RESILIENCE = VERSUS=20 RESISTANCE

19 February = 2002.=20 Ramallah is hermetically sealed after six Israeli soldiers were = killed=20 by Palestinian militants at a checkpoint west of the city. At a = main=20 checkpoint south of the city, hundreds of people near the = Qalandia=20 refugee camp watch the approaches on both sides for cars and=20 pedestrians. A child had just been shot at, but a determined = woman=20 carrying a bag strides toward the well-armed and protected = soldiers,=20 undeterred by shots fired in the air. She continues walking. = More shots=20 are fired; people are jumpy. She hesitates, but walks on until = she is=20 about 50 yards from the soldiers. A bullet hits the ground = beside her,=20 sending up a cloud of dust, and she stops. But her determination = has=20 gotten a soldier out of his jeep. He shouts something at her; = she shouts=20 back. He approaches, she leaves her bag on the ground and gets = closer,=20 there is an exchange of words and finally she is let=20 through.

Countless such = examples=20 every day testify to the magnitude of the phenomenon of defiance. = In the=20 last ten years, and certainly since the outbreak of the latest = uprising,=20 Palestinians have found ways to defy the closure policy with an = arsenal of=20 inventions to circumvent fences and roadblocks, despite the = soldiers, to=20 reach work and home, school and family. In Gaza during the Oslo = years,=20 work permits were purchased, identity cards and other papers = forged.=20 People attached themselves to the bottoms of vans or hid in pickup = trucks=20 full of potatoes or cabbages to smuggle themselves into Israel to = look for=20 work. They traveled overland to Cairo and from there flew to Amman = to=20 reach universities in the West Bank (until Israel restricted entry = of=20 Gazans through the Allenby Bridge)--all this before suicide = bombers used=20 the same tricks to sneak out and Israel tightened its grip. And = finally,=20 when people were unable to leave at all, they resorted to = university=20 outreach programs for education and to the Internet for social = life in=20 their narrow pale of settlement.

In these = intifada days,=20 people in Gaza walk miles along the beaches when the roads are = blocked to=20 Palestinians. In the West Bank, they ride donkeys or trek on foot = on rocky=20 paths across hills and mountains under the permanent danger of = being shot=20 at with stun grenades or live bullets. Closure in the Oslo years = meant=20 suffocation, but closure since the uprising also means physical = fear and=20 overcoming it.

Throughout the = closure=20 years, and especially since the second intifada, Palestinians have = given=20 proof of an amazing resilience, an almost limitless capacity to = endure=20 hardship. The only reason it cannot be termed "resistance" is that = it is=20 not organized. It is an individual, personal decision and behavior = adopted=20 by an entire collective, but it is not part of a centralized, = calculated=20 strategy to challenge Israeli orders and policies and to force = change. The=20 collective nature of this personal defiance is more visible today = than it=20 was during Oslo because closure all over the territories has = become far=20 more visible. Closure is no longer the abstract, bureaucratic = procedure of=20 asking for a permit and being rejected. Closure has become part of = Palestinian human and natural topography.

ABSENCE OF AN = ORGANIZED=20 STRATEGY OF RESISTANCE

Throughout the = occupation,=20 joint efforts--however ultimately ineffective--have been mounted = by=20 Palestinian, Israeli, and international NGOs to protest Israel's=20 settlement policy. Campaigns have also been launched, with = somewhat=20 greater success, against Israel's revocation of Palestinian = residency=20 rights and IDs in Jerusalem, as well as against its policy of = house=20 demolitions. This being the case, the question must be asked: Why = has the=20 closure policy received so little attention? Why was this policy = almost=20 completely ignored (apart from reference to economic = repercussions) by all=20 concerned parties--Palestinian elites, academics, political = parties and=20 leaders, Israeli peace activists, international pro-Palestinian = groups,=20 and Palestinian activists in the diaspora--at the time it was = taking deep=20 root in Gaza? And why has no strategized, organized, nonviolent = defiance=20 developed since, as its devastating consequences became = clear?

A number of = possible=20 explanations can be advanced for the failure to address the issue, = shedding light on the sociology of the Palestinian struggle = against=20 occupation, on the one hand, and the sociology of Israeli = policies, on the=20 other hand.

Since closure = was introduced=20 in 1991, Israel has succeeded in portraying it as an ad hoc = security=20 measure, a preemptive move against or reaction to terrorist = attacks. (Most=20 observers have failed to recall that the cancellation of = Palestinians'=20 exit permit to Israel in January 1991 occurred long before Hamas = initiated=20 suicide bombings inside Israeli towns and buses.) This perception = was=20 strengthened in later years as closure regulations were tightened=20 following a lethal attack or the (alleged?) exposure of a would-be = attack.=20 Even the Palestinians themselves internalized Israel's security = pretext:=20 how often have I heard friends ask in genuine surprise when denied = a=20 travel permit: "But I haven't done anything!" or "But it was years = ago=20 that I was detained!" Thus, in Israel, Palestine, and abroad, the = overall=20 impression has been that closure is a temporary measure that will = soon be=20 removed, and this understanding has obscured closure's true nature = and=20 greatly reduced the urgency of protest.

Given the focus = on its=20 economic effects, closure throughout the Oslo years was said to be = lifted=20 whenever Palestinian workers and businessmen were given permits to = cross=20 into Israel. If the labor flow was not totally severed and people = were=20 seen crossing Gaza's massive northern checkpoint at Erez, foreign = and=20 Palestinian proponents of the "building of peace and the economy = of peace"=20 expressed satisfaction, even gratitude and optimism. The great = majority of=20 the population, who could not leave because they had no work in = Israel or=20 business with Israelis, fell into the blind spot of the writers of = reality's "official version"--most journalists and the officials = and=20 diplomats who talk to the press. Lost from sight was the fact that = even=20 when the closure was "lifted," the vast majority of the population = still=20 couldn't go anywhere.

With time, free = movement for=20 reasons other than work or medical treatment (and even that often=20 curtailed by ad hoc restrictions) was no longer seen as a right = but as a=20 "luxury" for which it was somehow shameful to struggle. = Exemplifying the=20 kind of attitude that was internalized by many Palestinians is the = response by an Israeli officer to my suggestion in the early = stages of the=20 "peace process" in 1994 that a good "confidence-building step" = would be to=20 give women and old people a one-year "open permit" to leave the = Gaza=20 Strip. "They don't have any reason to get out," she had said. With = many=20 people having given up the hope of travel beyond a perimeter of a = few=20 dozen kilometers, closure from the public point of view became an = abstract=20 phenomenon.

Closure in its = pre-intifada=20 forms, though experienced by a huge collective of individuals, was = experienced as a separate ordeal. Requesting a permit, waiting for = it,=20 being refused, getting a two-day permit when the course you needed = to=20 attend lasts the whole semester, longing in vain to see the sea, = missing=20 your relatives--all these were common experiences shared by an = entire=20 people, but everyone went through it on their own: the individual = versus=20 the Restriction, the individual versus the Occupation, as if it = were a=20 personal matter, a stroke of personal bad luck. Occupation in its = form of=20 a restrictive pass system was splintered to three million parts, = and the=20 blanket prohibition was somehow overlooked.

Individuals = developed their=20 own ways to cope. When "infiltration" became harder after the = "electronic=20 wall" went up around Gaza in 1994, and after changes in the coded = IDs in=20 1995 made the fabrication and falsification of documents more = difficult,=20 many resorted to wasta (connections), especially with high = officials in=20 one or another of the Palestinian security agencies notorious for = cozy=20 relations with their Israeli counterparts. Some had the luck to = have=20 connections with international organizations that could help get = permits=20 for travel abroad. A few had contacts with Israeli organizations = or=20 personalities willing to help secure a pass into Israel. Some = found the=20 right contact person to whom to pay a bribe.

Just as the = effects of=20 closure were experienced as a private ordeal, getting a permit was = experienced as a personal lucky strike, rendering the idea of a = collective=20 protest absurd. The "privileged" individual whose entire = livelihood and=20 the welfare of his family depends on a permit was deterred from = joining=20 others in a public protest that could risk his portion of income=20 opportunity. An organized political protest carried no guarantee = of=20 success and could result in punishment--unlike good contacts with = a=20 security officer.

Finally, closure = during the=20 Oslo years took on definite class overtones: the political, = economic,=20 social, and intellectual elites always found ways to get permits = and get=20 out, sparing them the constant pressures of being locked up and = feeling=20 suffocated. This class phenomenon found its fullest expression in = the VIP=20 system institutionalized under Oslo: from the time the PA was = established,=20 PLO and PA officials were granted the privilege of free movement = in and=20 out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Jordan and Egypt, = respectively. It=20 was at the request of the PA (according to an Israeli official) = that the=20 privilege was soon extended to entering Israel and traveling = between the=20 Gaza Strip and the West Bank. There were three categories of VIP, = with=20 progressively diminishing privileges. VIP-Is could travel by car = without=20 prior arrangement, were not searched, and could be accompanied by = family=20 and other escorts. VIP-IIs had fewer privileges, and VIP-IIIs = still fewer.=20 The desire to get out of the Gaza Strip and to travel freely to = the West=20 Bank was so great that even former grass-roots militants who were = elected=20 to the Palestinian Council (PC) accepted VIP categorization = without=20 protest rather than try to secure their freedom of movement on a = less=20 patronizing and colonialist basis. Even so, these privileges = eroded over=20 time as Israeli officials claimed that they were being abused--and = indeed,=20 it is known that PC members (VIP-IIs) often gave rides to Gazans = studying=20 in the West Bank. Still, up to the current intifada, PA and some = PLO=20 officials enjoyed almost "normal" freedom of movement.

THE MISSING=20 VANGUARD

Organizing = serious protest=20 is not possible without the participation of a political and = intellectual=20 vanguard. Yet for the reasons mentioned, during the Oslo years = those who=20 could have made up this vanguard either did not fully grasp the = underlying=20 purpose of closure as a means of control and political leverage or = were=20 unable to participate in fighting it. This applies, for differing = reasons,=20 to the various groups that might have been capable of playing = significant=20 roles: the PA, Fatah, Islamist groups, Palestinian leftists, and = the=20 Israeli peace camp.

The = PA: With the transfer of = powers to the=20 new authority in Gaza in May 1994, the fact that the area was = already=20 virtually sealed off in a sense served the leadership's political = and=20 economic needs and corresponded to their previous experiences.=20 Politically, it is easier to mold and control a population closed = in a=20 small territorial unit, where movements can be closely monitored.=20 Moreover, closure and loss of jobs in Israel made a large segment = of the=20 population directly dependent on official (poorly paid) jobs, = increasing=20 personal indebtedness to the PA. Recruitment into the inflated = security=20 agencies and civilian ministries became the greatest job-creation = project=20 in the Strip (however redundant these jobs were from an economic = and=20 managerial standpoint) and took the place of a state welfare = system.=20 Economically, closure eased and speeded up the creation of the PA = trade=20 monopolies, with established local businessmen being forced to = give up=20 their share of the market and join the monopolies: if a "merger = offer" was=20 rejected, the PA could make certain that the recalcitrant = businessman=20 would not get travel permits.

PA senior = officials and=20 security officers never complained about closure when they met = with their=20 Israeli counterparts. Some Israeli members of the Knesset from the = Communist Party told me that when they raised the issue of closure = with=20 Yitzhak Rabin, he had told them that since Arafat never raised the = issue=20 there was no need to change it. And by the time the devastating=20 repercussions of closure became clear to the Palestinians, it was = too late=20 to develop a response.

Fatah: As the dominant party in = the PA and=20 with the largest mass following and network in the territories, = Fatah was=20 the first organization to cash in on the benefits of = power--benefits=20 closely dependent not only on the PA's system of patronage and = nepotism=20 but also on Israeli goodwill. One of the main such benefits was = freedom of=20 movement, a privilege to which the PA "newcomers" from Tunis, = being closer=20 to power, had greater access, accentuating the dichotomy between=20 themselves and the local Fatah leadership. For the local leaders, = freedom=20 of movement and other "privileges" anesthetized whatever = contesting spirit=20 may have survived Oslo and soon alienated them from the base. This = gave=20 rise to a bitterness and even self-disgust that expressed itself = in=20 ever-greater indulgence in such benefits of free movement as = economic=20 initiatives, recreational evenings out of the cage, and so = on.

In 1997, I asked = some=20 rank-and-file Fatah members who were complaining about being = sealed in the=20 Strip why they did not initiate activities that would draw world = attention=20 to their reality. For example, it had been suggested that Fatah = organize a=20 march of tens of thousands toward the northern "border" of the = Gaza Strip=20 in exercise of their basic human right to free movement, and that = one way=20 of not getting fired at was to have the demonstration led by some = of=20 Arafat's top aides. But the young men had an immediate answer: the = big=20 shots will never join.

The Islamist=20 groups: = The only=20 organization in Palestine capable of getting tens of thousands of = people=20 into the streets for a march or demonstration was Hamas; in = January 1996,=20 more than 100,000 people had turned out for the funeral of Yahya = Ayyash,=20 assassinated by Israel for numerous lethal attacks. But the = Islamist=20 groups would never sponsor demonstrations against settlements or = closure=20 or even the occupation per se, since this would imply acceptance = of the=20 two-state solution and of the "Oslo" reality, to which they were=20 ideologically opposed. More generally, the Islamist organizations = engage=20 both in charity and mass social activities and in armed actions, = but civil=20 disobedience is not part of their agenda. In the nonviolent = demonstrations=20 sometimes organized by the NGOs and seculars in the West Bank to = reach=20 Israeli checkpoints, participation by Hamas sympathizers is=20 low.

The leftist=20 groups: = The=20 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and = Popular Front=20 for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) devoted their flagging = energies to=20 attacking Oslo and the PA's conduct but failed to develop = strategies of=20 opposition. Aware of their weakness within society and vis-=E0-vis = the PA=20 (on which many of them depended for their salaries and budgets), = they were=20 further disadvantaged by an antiquated system of "centralized = democracy."=20 Policies were dictated from headquarters abroad, where different = realities=20 prevailed. Of the various leftist organizations, the People's = Party=20 (former Communists) has been the most engaged in the grass-roots=20 anti-occupation activities that demanded cooperation with Israeli=20 activists, though such activities addressed mostly settlements and = land=20 confiscations. The larger PFLP refrained from joint actions with = Israelis=20 on the grounds that such cooperation represented=20 "normalization."

The Israeli = peace=20 camp: In = 1991, the=20 peace camp mistakenly interpreted closure as a return to the Green = Line,=20 which it welcomed as a kind of proof that the solution to the = conflict=20 lays in ultimately giving up the territories. What the peace camp = failed=20 to see was that the Green Line was a border for Palestinians only = and that=20 Israelis could cross it to settle and move about freely. This=20 misperception persisted deep into the Oslo years. Moreover, from = the start=20 of the Oslo process, the great majority of Israeli peace = supporters=20 believed that their intervention was no longer needed in the march = toward=20 a Palestinian state. The peace camp preferred not to notice such = "trifles"=20 as the draconian restrictions on Palestinian movement, settlement=20 expansion, the construction of bypass roads, and the splintering = of the=20 Palestinian territories into small enclaves, perceiving all these=20 developments as temporary, accidental, and amendable.

ISRAEL'S = STRATEGY:=20 PREMEDITATED OR IMPROVISED?

Besides the = question of why=20 there was no strategized, organized Palestinian response to = closure, a=20 second question must be asked. This is the extent to which the = Israeli=20 decision makers foresaw the debilitating side effects of closure = when they=20 began introducing it as of the late 1980s and devised the policy=20 accordingly. Judging from the piecemeal way in which closure was = applied=20 in the early years, my own reading is that the concept of the = system and=20 its colonialist "advantages" were realized and elaborated with = time. The=20 lack of international, Israeli, and Palestinian attention to the=20 phenomenon allowed the Israeli policies of domination to take root = and=20 develop.

Yet even in its = embryonic=20 form, prior to Madrid, the pass system illuminated some basics = about=20 Israeli concepts that gradually shaped what was to become an = apartheid=20 rule. Restricting Palestinian entry into Israel proper was seen as = an=20 answer to growing Israeli concerns that the still-continuing = intifada=20 would "spill over into Israel," especially if Palestinian national = demands=20 were not met. A scattering of deadly individual attacks against = Israelis=20 (though not at all on the scale known later) reinforced such = fears. And=20 without any pressure from the Israeli population to get to the = root of the=20 problem by addressing Palestinian demands--on the contrary, the=20 overwhelming desire was "not to have Arabs in our midst"--there = was=20 certainly no governmental inclination to address the issue = politically.=20 Moreover, the "security" concerns dovetailed nicely with = developments in=20 the labor market and concerns about reducing dependence on = Palestinian=20 labor. Jobs hitherto performed by Palestinians came to be seen as = possible=20 employment outlets for the influx of new immigrants from the = Soviet Union,=20 and the long curfews of the previous three years of intifada had = already=20 accustomed Israeli employers, especially in industry, to replacing = Palestinian workers with Israelis. (Ariel Sharon, as housing = minister in=20 the 1980s, was one of the first to encourage the import of foreign = workers.) The first full-fledged imposition of closure, then, = responded to=20 both these concerns.

But what had = begun as a=20 military-bureaucratic measure aimed primarily at containing and=20 suppressing unrest soon developed into something more = far-reaching. A pass=20 system on such a scale cannot but acquire its own bureaucratic = logic, and=20 within a few years had become entrenched in such a way that = reversing it=20 would have required a determined effort. At the same time, changes = in the=20 international environment in the wake of the Gulf War and the end = of the=20 bipolar world made it clear that Israel could not continue its = direct=20 occupation undisturbed--occupation, after all, does not = necessarily=20 require a direct military presence if the military power is able = to=20 dictate and control the development and future of the nonvoting = community.=20 The result of this new approach was Oslo, into which the by-now = well=20 entrenched pass system was seamlessly incorporated.

Closure also had = very clear=20 immediate advantages in the negotiating process underway. = Particularly=20 under Rabin and Peres, the use of closure as an instrument of = economic=20 leverage over the PA was blatant. "You arrest this one or that = one, and=20 we'll give you 500 more work permits" and "If you behave = yourselves and=20 agree to our (slow) implementation timetables, we'll allow you to = export=20 more vegetables and release from Israeli customs the heavy = machinery you=20 imported" were the unexpressed but widely understood premises = underlying=20 negotiations.

With time, what = had=20 originally been an ad hoc military-bureaucratic measure = crystallized into=20 a fully conscious Israeli strategy with a clear political goal: = separation=20 between the two peoples with an appearance of political = separation,=20 but with only one government--Israel--having any effective power = to shape=20 the destinies of both. The hopes vested in Oslo as a peace process = by the=20 international community and the Palestinians, coupled with the=20 debilitating side effects of closure described above and the = stunted=20 nature of Palestinian politics, blurred this overriding vision and = paralyzed the Palestinians' ability to combat closure as an = instrument of=20 control.

Meanwhile, = settlement=20 expansion, aimed at establishing the would-be inner borders of = Palestinian=20 enclaves, was accelerating during the Oslo years. The PA's promise = to=20 fight terror and violence while continuing to negotiate despite = the=20 ongoing settlement activity gave Israelis the impression that = peace with=20 settlements was possible. Thus settlement expansion was not an = innocent=20 mistake, as Yossi Beilin, one of the architects of Oslo, tries to = portray=20 it now. It consolidated the creation of "one state in one = country." With=20 an occupying power's free access to land, water, and space, Israel = was=20 able to send its settlement offshoots into the West Bank, along = the Jordan=20 Valley and the Green Line and adjacent to the big Palestinian = towns and=20 refugee camps. The State of Israel and its sovereignty were = extended de=20 facto from the river to the sea: Israeli infrastructure, Israeli = laws,=20 Israeli taxation and tax-exemptions, Israeli electricity grids and = water=20 and telephone networks, Israeli subsidies and ministries and = schools. And=20 wedged in between these offshoots, hemmed in by the vast, = supermodern,=20 carefully planned network of connecting bypass roads, a second = "state" was=20 allowed to exist: a chain of mini-entities and disconnected = enclaves where=20 another people lives under a different set of laws (a combination = of=20 Israeli military orders and Palestinian crippled rule of law = overruled by=20 arbitrariness). But this second "state," deprived of elementary = access to=20 land, water, and space, is likewise deprived of any chance of free = development for individuals or community.

The Palestinian = leadership,=20 having underestimated the effects of Israeli policies and having = been=20 blinded by the personal benefits Oslo offered, failed to challenge = the=20 creation of the One State and the de facto demographic separation=20 (closure) by a planned strategy of civil disobedience that might = have=20 drawn world attention to the combined implications of closure and=20 settlements in time.

Closure during = the Oslo=20 years succeeded in totally severing relations between the Gaza = Strip and=20 the West Bank, creating a de facto Palestinian ministate in Gaza. = The=20 Labor government in 1995 had calculated that Arafat would = eventually=20 accept this ministate and agree to postpone indefinitely the = creation of a=20 Palestinian state in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But here, = the PA=20 stood its ground, and closure as an instrument of pressure did not = achieve=20 its ultimate political goal: Palestinian legitimation of = demographic=20 separation termed "statehood," but without any of its true = attributes or=20 meaningful sovereignty.

CONCLUSION

Prior to the = Oslo years,=20 Israel could not have ignored (as it does now) its obligations as = an=20 occupying power to the occupied population: the hope of = "containing" the=20 deep discontent in the territories could not yet go too far beyond = the=20 constraints of international conventions. In those times, Israel = could not=20 have resorted in the OPT to the Grapes of Wrath-type offensives it = unleashed in Lebanon or tried to "uproot terror" by shelling = refugee camps=20 from the air and land, using tanks and helicopters to massively = target=20 civilians in the hopes of killing gunmen and potential suiciders,=20 bulldozing hundreds of houses, wantonly smashing private property, = and=20 razing vast green agricultural areas. Also, Israeli direct = military=20 control of Palestinian-inhabited areas naturally limited = Palestinian=20 access to arms, ammunition, and the ability to develop homemade = bombs and=20 rockets, which became possible during the years of limited = self-rule. This=20 has facilitated Israel's public relations task, enabling it to = present its=20 war against an entire population as symmetrical warfare between = two=20 political entities: the PA as aggressor and Israel compelled to = defend=20 itself.

Attempts to = challenge=20 closure nonviolently have proven risky, even deadly. The Israeli=20 army--which does not hesitate to fire on civilians, even = international=20 solidarity activists who occasionally visit the OPT to protest the = siege--has made clear that it will not tolerate any mass = demonstration=20 approaching its well-protected tanks and armored cars and = positions. From=20 the very first days, the al-Aqsa intifada devolved into a = situation where=20 armed men engaging in "macho" shooting into the air next to = unarmed=20 demonstrators gave Israel the pretext to "shoot back," killing and = injuring hundreds of people. Guerrilla attacks on the roads of the = occupied territories and terrorist attacks against civilians in = Israel=20 resulted, inter alia, in expanding the practice of internal = closure at the=20 junctions between "Israeli" (area C) and Palestinian territory, as = defined=20 under Oslo II.

There is no = intifada now in=20 the real sense of the word. There is no mass civilian = participation in=20 anti-occupation activities. There is, however, a spirit of=20 intifada, which is now expressed in the individual but massive = resilience=20 in the face of a relentless siege. The intifada, then, is now = reduced to=20 the resilience of three million people under the weight of = Israel's brutal=20 suppression of a nonexistent intifada. Just as was the case in the = Oslo=20 years, three million individuals are drawing on immense personal = reserves=20 to bear the hardships of siege without surrender. What they lack = is a=20 vanguard central power that could consciously work at transforming = this=20 vast individual capacity into a collective strategy of = nonviolent--and=20 thus far more effective--resistance.

During the Oslo = years, it=20 seemed that the Israelis were hoping that the leverage of closure, = with=20 its overall debilitating effects, would eventually produce = Palestinian=20 consent to the final status deal envisaged. The fiasco of Camp = David=20 proved how wrong they were. The current intensification of the = closure=20 policy was imposed with the intention of containing the latest = Palestinian=20 uprising. Instead, it is developing into a ruthless war between = one of the=20 strongest and best equipped armies in the world and a battalion of = volunteering suiciders. Closure, far from helping to crush the = defiance,=20 is now adding fuel to the fire of the frustration and wrath. = Palestinians=20 increasingly are resorting to individual acts of killing and = suicide=20 attacks, backed by the great majority of an embittered, caged=20 population.

Back to the Journal of = Palestine=20 Studies index.
Back to = the=20 Institute for Palestine Studies Homepage.

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